A simple empirical nonlinear framework is used to analyse monetary policy between 1983 and 2007 in South Africa, focusing on the policy of in ‡ation targeting introduced in Feb 2000, more precisely when the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) announced that an in ‡ation zone targeting regime of 3-6% would be in place. We …nd that a model speci…cation embodying a simple 'in ‡ation learning rule'for the future in ‡ation rate seems to provide a better understanding of the decision process made by the SARB in its interest rate setting policy. The main …ndings are that the adoption of in ‡ation targeting led to signi…cant changes in monetary policy, secondly, post-2000 monetary policy is asymmetric as policy-makers respond more to downward deviation of in ‡ation away from the target, thirdly, post-2000 policy-makers may be attempting to keep in ‡ation within the 4.5%-6.9% range rather than pursuing a target zone of 3-6% as generally preannounced and fourthly, the response of monetary policy to in ‡ation is nonlinear as interest rates respond more when in ‡ation is further from the target.
Introduction
Since the 1990s, a growing number of central banks have adopted in ‡ation targeting as a preferred framework for monetary policy. This has replaced frameworks involving targets for the exchange rate or monetary aggregates. South Africa has pursued a monetary policy strategy that included setting some pre-announced M3 and other intermediate targets (such as the exchange rates) from 1986 until 2000 (Jonsson 2001 ), when formal in ‡ation targeting was introduced. In February 2000, the Ministry of Finance announced in the Budget speech that the government had decided to set an in ‡ation target range of 3-6% (van der Merwe 2004). Before this announcement "informal in ‡ation targeting" was already applied by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). In ‡ation target provides what is known as nominal anchor for monetary policy. In such a framework, an in ‡ation objective is announced and a clear commitment to achieve this objective is spelt out and this helps shape the public's expectations, consequently helping planning and also providing an anchor for expectations of future in ‡ation to in ‡uence price and wage setting decisions. The verdict on in ‡ation targets has thus far been positive (see Bernanke et al. 1999; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 2001; Corbo et al. 2001; Vega and Winkelreid 2005) and it has also been stressed that the way in which monetary policy is implemented can be a key factor to the macroeconomic stability of the country (see Clarida et al. 2000) . This paper considers a number of important research questions related to in ‡ation targeting. First, has in ‡ation targeting a¤ected the conduct of monetary policy? We might expect an increased emphasis to be placed on in ‡ation and a correspondingly lower weight to be placed on output. We would like to test this hypothesis. Woglom (2003) using a linear speci…cation tries to address the issue of the legacy of in ‡ation targeting. However given the very short sample size the results would have been too tentative to draw sound policy conclusions. Second is the policy symmetric, in the sense that policy-makers might attempt to have di¤erent interest rate adjustment depending on whether deviations of in ‡ation is above or below the target? The literature has often argued for cases of 'hawk'type or 'dove'type Central Bankers. Third, do policy-makers attempt to hit the in ‡ation target precisely in which case we would argue for point in ‡ation target, or do they aim to keep in ‡ation within a target range as announced in February 2000? (see Mishkin and Posen 1997; Bernanke et al. 1999) Fourth, is monetary policy more responsive to in ‡ation when it is further from the target, or is the policy response always linear?
In this paper we make use of a simple nonlinear structural Taylor rule type framework to analyse South African monetary policy between 1983 and 2007, focusing on the policy of in ‡ation targeting introduced in 2000. In this forward looking framework we posit that the private sector in ‡ation expectations follow a simple rule, that is a linear function of the in ‡ation target and the lagged in ‡ation rate as originally posited by King (1996) . Our main conclusions are as follows. (i) The simple 'in ‡ation learning rule'seems to capture the dynamics of the policy instrument better compared to alternative speci…cation of how agents form their expectation of future in ‡ation. (ii) The adoption of the in ‡ation target has led to signi…cant changes in monetary policy. Before 2000 the in ‡uence of output was stronger than that of in ‡ation; after 1992 we …nd that the in ‡uence of in ‡ation is much increased while output has no e¤ect. (iii) Monetary policy since 2000 has been asymmetric as policy-makers now respond more to a downward deviation of in ‡ation away from the target than to upward deviations. (iv) Since 2000 policy-makers may be attempting to slightly overshooting their pre-announced target zone (4.5%-6.9% v=s 3%-6%) (v) Monetary policy is more responsive to in ‡ation when it is further from the target, therefore implying nonlinear adjustment of the interest rate. To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst attempt to model and compare across regimes the South African monetary policy using a non-linear model of interest rate rule. This paper is organised along the following lines. The next section sketches the modelling framework that can account for the issues raised above. Section 3 estimates the model, presents our …ndings and discusses the implications for these issues. Section 4 concludes.
Modelling monetary policy

Monetary policy in SA since 2000
Target ranges of 1-5% for core in ‡ation were informally announced from 1998. With the institution of an in ‡a-tion targeting regime, an explicit target of 3-6% (average) for a new CPI measure, CPIX 1 , was announced in the Budget Speech of February, 2000. Therefore policy appears to be evolving towards greater transparency, aiming to improve credibility and to achieve a more pronounced e¤ect on in ‡ationary expectations.
Empirical models of monetary policy are widely used to investigate the objectives of policymakers. The great majority of studies use the Taylor rule model and its extensions (e.g., Taylor, 1993; Clarida et al., 2000) , where interest rates relate linearly to the gap between actual and desired values of in ‡ation and output. More controversially, Taylor rules have also been used to analyse optimal monetary policy, that is, the values of monetary policy instruments that would best allow policy-makers to attain their policy goals.
Taylor rules are an example of what Svensson (2002 Svensson ( , 2003 Recently, researchers have questioned the original linear speci…cation of the Taylor rule. A nonlinear framework applies if, for instance, the central bank has non-quadratic preferences (Nobay and Peel, 2003) , a nonlinear Phillips curve (Dolado et al. 2005; Schaling 2004) or, if it follows the opportunistic approach to disin ‡ation (Aksoy et al., 2007) . According to the OAD approach, interest rates should respond to in ‡ation outside a zone of discretion and behave opportunistically inside by accommodating shocks that tend to move in ‡ation towards the target but not otherwise responding to shocks until in ‡ation reverts to the zone of discretion. These suggestions are particularly relevant for the SARB which aims to keep in ‡ation within the 3-6% target. Our work is much in the tradition of investigating the objectives of the SARB in the light of a 1 CPIX is de…ned as CPI excluding interest rates on mortgage bonds nonlinear speci…cation which will best re ‡ect these objectives.
We employ a framework which has similarities with Smooth Transition Auto-Regressive (STAR) models (Granger and Terasvirta 1993; van Dijk et al. 2002) , in that the endogenous variable is determined by a weighted average of regimes with endogenous regime weights. We will consider a nonlinear policy rule of the form:
where 
is the in ‡ation target, (y t+p y ) is the output gap expected at time (t + p), is the weight on in ‡ation and y is the weight on output gap. We also consider especially relevant the issue of whether the interest rate setting by the Central Bank depends on asset prices (see Bernanke and Gertler 2001) and e represents the weight on the gap of other potential variables such as exchange rates and other …nancial variables, for instance, house prices, stock prices and commodity prices (for our purpose we shall use the growth rate in the nominal e¤ective exchange rates following Ortiz and Sturzenegger (2007) , and " t is an error term. The response of interest rates to lagged interest rates, in ‡ation, the output gap and the exchange rate is allowed to di¤er between in ‡ation regimes. R It (I standing for inner) is the inner regime Taylor rule that represents the behavior of policymakers when in ‡ation is expected to lie in between the bands L and U . R Ot (O standing for outer) is a Taylor rule that describes the behavior of policy-makers in the outer regime where in ‡ation is expected to be outside the in ‡ation bands.
The nonlinear function t (E t t+p ; ; L ; U ) can take a number of speci…cations. It could take a threshold speci…cation where the authorities would behave linearly but with di¤erent speeds of response depending on the value of a given variable (Bec et al. 2002) . The nonlinear function can be smooth rather than discrete and it could measure, for instance, the weight, at the beginning of period t, that in ‡ation at period t + p will be less than x percentage points, in which case it is modelled using the logistic function (see Granger and Terasvirta, 1993; and van Dijk et al., 2002) . Bec et al. (2000) use a STAR representation to model monetary policy in the United States, France and Germany. They allow monetary policy to vary between periods of 'boom'and 'slump'. For our purpose, we prefer using the quadratic logistic function (see for e.g., Martin and Milas (2004) for an application to the UK) as it allows for an in ‡ation zone targeting regime as is the case for South Africa as well as for allowing a nonlinear adjustment toward the band. This form of the Taylor rule allows the response of the interest rate to di¤er between the two in ‡ation regimes, inner and outer. The weight t is modelled as follows:
Equation (2) equates the regime weight t to the probability that expected in ‡ation will lie between the bands L and U . This function has the properties that (i) becomes constant as ! 0 and (ii) as ! 1, Jansen and Teräsvirta 1996) . To illustrate this, if it is known with certainty that in ‡ation will (resp. will not) be between the bands, then policy is determined by R I (resp. R O ). In general, the weight on R I is greater the larger is the probability that expected in ‡ation will lie between L and U . If one regime is always dominant, our model simpli…es to a familiar Taylor rule model of monetary policy. In (2), the smoothness parameter > 0 determines the smoothness of the transition regimes. We follow Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994) in making dimension-free by dividing it by the variance of E t t+p . In addition, van Dijk et al. (2002) argue that the likelihood function is very insensitive to , suggesting that precise estimation of this parameter is unlikely in our relatively short sample. For this reason, we do not attempt to use estimates of to test our model against the alternative of a linear model. Note that our approach di¤ers from STAR models in using a forward-looking variable to determine the regime weights.
Monetary policy before 2000
There have been two broad monetary policy regimes before 2000 3 . The …rst regime was a liquid asset ratiobased system with quantitative controls on interest rates and credit, operated until the early 1980s. A low degree of importance was attached to the interest rate as a corrective tool, the main form of monetary control being the use of liquid asset requirements. Commercial banks held particular assets de…ned as "liquid" as a speci…ed minimum proportion of deposits. The limited supply and low yields of these assets were expected to curtail bank lending and money supply growth.
Increasing dissatisfaction with the …nancial constraints of the liquid asset ratio system, saw a range of reforms enacted from the early 1980s, toward a cash reserves-based system. Under the cash reserves system, pre-announced monetary targets were used for the …rst time from 1986, to be achieved indirectly through adjusting interest rates. Therefore the main policy emphasis was on the central bank's discount rate in in ‡uencing the cost of overnight collateralised lending and hence market interest rates. We therefore propose to analyse the period from 1983 to 1999. We choose this particular period as it is di¢ cult to estimate stable policy rules using data from before this date, when the Reserve Bank switched to using the interest rate as the main instrument of monetary policy with reference to monetary targets. It is also worth noting that during this period there was also emphasis on an eclectic set of economic indicators such as the exchange rate, asset prices, output gap, balance of payments, wage settlements, total credit extension and the …scal stance (SARB Quarterly Bulletin, October, 1997) . Modelling all of these features and going prior to 1983 will take us beyond the scope of this study. Moreover, note a dual exchange rate system was introduced to South Africa in 1979: the …nancial rand was a free- ‡oating market-based currency for capital transactions, whilst the commercial rand was arti…cially held at higher levels to attract foreign investment. This dual system was abolished in 1983 and replaced by a ‡oating rate with Reserve Bank intervention. 4 Also given our rather short sample size in the later period, it would not be feasible to model these using a nonlinear policy rule which is already heavily parameterised.
We use a similar approach in developing a model of monetary policy for the period before in ‡ation targets were introduced in 2000, that is, from 1983. We specify our model as:
where
Oe E t (e t+p e ) and 0 t is the probability that expected in ‡ation will lie between the bands L 0 and U 0 . The only main di¤erence here is that the Taylor rule uses in ‡ation rather than in ‡ation relative to the target.
Model hypothesis
In this section we set out the model hypothesis that will allow us to address the questions raised on in ‡ation targeting in the introduction. The way in which monetary policy has changed since the advent of in ‡ation targeting can be investigated by considering di¤erences in the estimated parameters between regimes.
Firstly, if we expect the SARB to place greater importance on in ‡ation since 2000, then we would expect the regime boundaries to narrow, implying
Secondly, we would expect changes across the two monetary regimes so that under the in ‡ation targeting regime, the response to in ‡ation is higher and that to output is lower, implying that
Oy . We would also expect the weight on the exchange rate to increase, implying that, Oe > 0 Oe . Thirdly, to test asymmetric responses to in ‡ation after 2000, implying that deviations of in ‡ation (either positive or negative) from the target zone is not seen as equally bad, we devise the following hypothesis. We therefore amend the outer regime R Ot in equation (1) to include positive deviation of in ‡ation from the upper band E t ( t+p ) + and negative deviation of in ‡ation from the lower band E t ( t+p ) as in equation (4) below. The relevant hypothesis if policy is symmetric after 2000 is: H 0 :
+ O > O if for instance we suspect that the SARB has more of a de ‡ationary bias.
Fourthly we can also examine whether policy-makers are pursuing a point target or a target range. 
Alternative speci…cations
Simple linear version of the Taylor rule such as equation (4) has been used in the literature to test changes in monetary policy conduct (see for e.g., Taylor (1993) for the US and Nelson (2000) for the UK). In the South African context, Aron and Muellbauer (2000) and in later stages, Woglom (2003) have employed a similar structure to investigate whether in ‡ation targeting has a¤ected the conduct of monetary policy.
However, these Taylor rules cannot be used to address the other issues considered in this paper. Asymmetry in monetary policy might be analysed using an augmented Taylor rule of the form:
This model includes in ‡ation rates above and below the in ‡ation target as separate variables and so allows for di¤erential responses from policy-makers. This type of model has been used by Dolado et al. (2000) to analyse monetary policy in Germany, France, Spain and the United States in the period before monetary union (see also Gerlach (2000) and Surico (2002) ). Although helpful and informative about asymmetry, this model cannot be used to address any of the other issues. We might also use the augmented Taylor rule:
to analyse monetary policy where policy-makers are more responsive to in ‡ation when it is further from the there is no other model that could be used to address the issue of whether policy-makers have a point target or a target range; nor is there any other single model that can be used to analyse all of the other issues.
Econometric results
Our analysis is based on quarterly data 1983q1-2007q4 for South Africa. The sample period corresponds roughly to the two monetary regimes discussed above. We use the money market rate as the nominal interest rate. In ‡ation is the annual proportional change in the consumer price index. Output is measured using the real GDP and we measure the output gap as the deviation of this from a Hodrick-Prescott (1997) trend.
We also use the growth rate of the nominal e¤ective exchange rate as an explanatory variable in the interest rate rule.
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In estimation, we compute the measure of expected future in ‡ation for post-1999q4 period by a simple in ‡ation learning rule. King (1996) analyzes two extreme cases of in ‡ation formation: (1) a completely credible policy regime where private sector expectations adjust immediately to the in ‡ation target (since the announcement is fully credible) this is the case of rational or model consistent expectations; (2) exogenous learning. In general, expectations are a¤ected both by the in ‡ation target and by actual in ‡ation performance. After experiencing high in ‡ation for a long period of time, there may be good reasons for the private sector not to believe the disin ‡ation policy fully (see also Bom…m and Rudebusch (2000) and Schaling (2003) ). In his discussion of endogenous learning, King (1996) says that it might be rational for the private sector to suppose that in trying to learn about the future in ‡ation rate many of the relevant factors are exogenous to the path of in ‡ation itself. In light of this, King assumes that private sector in ‡ation expectations follow a simple rule, that is a linear function of the in ‡ation target and the lagged in ‡ation rate. In this respect, we model the one period ahead expected in ‡ation, E t t+1 = T + (1 ) t 1 (where captures the credibility of the new regime, we set = 0:5 and E t t+p uses p = 1 as our preferred speci…cation), denotes that agents use the target in ‡ation rate (where
is an average of the two pre-announced bands L = 3% and U = 6%) and past information of up to the …rst lag to form their view of what in ‡ation would be in the next period. 7 For 1983q1-1999q4, we use the …rst lag of in ‡ation as a measure of the one period ahead expected in ‡ation, E t t+1 = t 1 . And for the output gap we use E t (y t+p y ) = (y t 1 y ).
8 6 All data have been obtained from the o¢ cial website of the SARB. 7 We also make use of an alternative measure of one period ahead expected in ‡ation, Et t+1 = T + (1 )0:25
to capture the use of past information at higher lag order. However this speci…cation does not signi…cantly change the results under study.
Unit root tests 9 showed that the nominal interest rate, in ‡ation, the output gap and the growth rate in the exchange rate are stationary variables. The order of integration of the in ‡ation rate is more ambiguous.
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The results from estimating model equation (1) period are presented in column (iii). The diagnostic tests show no serious misspeci…cation in Table 1 except for a slight serial correlation issue in column (i) for the model which uses lag in ‡ation. noting that the 'in ‡ation learning rule'provides a response to in ‡ation which is almost twice the magnitude of just using lag in ‡ation. In a linear version of the Taylor rule, Woglom (2003) using a combination of lagged in ‡ation and the lagged output gap found that the coe¢ cient is higher when CPIX is used in the place of CPI. However the magnitude of the response coe¢ cient happens to be of a marginally lesser value than the one we obtain under the 'in ‡ation learning rule'. The response to output was signi…cantly much higher prior to the in ‡ation targeting period. In addition, Woglom (2003) also found that the real exchange rate appears to play no role in the formulation of monetary policy, a result that we con…rm in this study with respect to the appreciation and depreciation of the currency. As far as the exchange rate is concerned a similar result has also been obtained by Ortiz and Sturzenegger (2007) The results are not reported but are available on request. 1 0 The in ‡ation rate could be stationary or not depending on the speci…cation of an intercept or a trend and an intercept in the test for a unit root.
1 1 In addition, Ortiz and Sturzenegger (2007) found the policy reaction function of the SARB to be stable with a consistent anti in ‡ation bias, and a somewhat large weight on output. However, with Ortiz and Sturzenegger (2007) not comparing across regimes, it is di¢ cult to put their results into context with our …ndings.
Secondly, the hypothesis test for asymmetric responses to in ‡ation post-1999 shows that there is an in ‡ation bias to monetary policy as the response to in ‡ation is lower for larger in ‡ation values. Notice that the results are contradictory as to whether one uses lag in ‡ation or the learning rule for expected future in ‡ation given that the model with lag in ‡ation tends to suggest that the policy maker is more of a 'hawk' than a 'dove' and therefore attaching greater priority to increases in in ‡ation above the target than to decreases below the target. These results support the recent announcement of the South African Reserve
Bank to respond to expansionary/recessionary pressures and therefore to be more tolerable to in ‡ationary pressures in order to mitigate business cycles downturns. However we would like to emphasize that there may be caveat to this …nding. Our …nding of a strong asymmetry with respect to an in ‡ationary bias needs to be re-investigated when su¢ cient data are available.
Third, we …nd that policy-makers are attempting to pursue an in ‡ation zone targeting regime rather than a point target one. The estimate of O is signi…cantly greater than zero, so policy-makers adjust the interest rate in the outer regime in order to move in ‡ation towards the target. However, we …nd that the estimate of I is insigni…cant, suggesting that policy-makers do not adjust interest rates to move in ‡ation towards the target when in the inner regime. This also tells us that the response of monetary policy to in ‡ation is nonlinear as interest rates respond more when in ‡ation is further from the target.
Conclusion
This paper argues that there have been important changes in the conduct of monetary policy in South Africa since the adoption of an in ‡ation targeting regime in 2000, which is also our focus of study. We have estimated a simple nonlinear structural model of monetary policy and the appeal of this method lies in its ability to reveal structure in data that might be missed by classical linear methods. Also a model embodying a simple 'in ‡ation learning rule'seems to capture the dynamics of the policy instrument better than alternative speci…cations of how agents form their expectation of future in ‡ation. We argue that in ‡ation targeting in practice has been asymmetric, we suggest that monetary policy throughout this period has responded more to in ‡ation when it is further from the target, and we speculate that in the post-1999 period policy-makers may have been marginally overshooting the announced target zone within a range 4.5%-6.9%. It is also worth mentioning that we should take these results with a pinch of caution given the relatively small sample size of the in ‡ation targeting regime. We intend to explore these issues in future work. Table 1 Parameter estimates for equ. (1) 
